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Digital Transformation of the Economy: Challenges, Trends and New Opportunities pp 635–645 Cite as

Characteristics of Russian Government Financial Resources: Historical Overview and the Situation Under Digital Economy

  • T. M. Kovaleva 17 ,
  • E. N. Valieva 17 &
  • E. V. Popova 17  
  • Conference paper
  • First Online: 06 February 2019

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Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC,volume 908)

This paper presents the findings on government finances analysis. Income generation characteristics are studied. Territorial expense breakdown is considered throughout different historical periods of the country’s social economic development. General differences and similarities in territorial budget sources of income and expenses powers are determined throughout the Russian Federation history.

  • Budget income and expenses
  • Budget policy
  • Financial relations
  • State finances

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T. M. Kovaleva, E. N. Valieva & E. V. Popova

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Department of Applied Management, Samara State University of Economics, Samara, Russia

Svetlana Ashmarina

School of Accounting and Administration, Polytechnic Institute of Porto, São Mamede de Infesta, Portugal

Anabela Mesquita

Institute of Technology and Business, České Budějovice, Czech Republic

Marek Vochozka

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Kovaleva, T.M., Valieva, E.N., Popova, E.V. (2020). Characteristics of Russian Government Financial Resources: Historical Overview and the Situation Under Digital Economy. In: Ashmarina, S., Mesquita, A., Vochozka, M. (eds) Digital Transformation of the Economy: Challenges, Trends and New Opportunities. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 908. Springer, Cham.

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  • 18 March 2020
  • Correction 25 March 2020

Russia aims to revive science after era of stagnation

  • Quirin Schiermeier

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President Vladimir Putin shakes a robot’s hand at a telecommunications company in Perm, Russia. Credit: Alexei Druzhinin/TASS via Getty

In the twilight of a winter’s afternoon on the outskirts of Moscow, a disc-shaped building stands out against dreary tower blocks and largely vacant car parks. This avant-garde architecture — called simply the Disk — hosts several research institutes, including the Russian Quantum Centre, a private institute founded in 2010. Inside its curved, gleaming halls, physicist Denis Kurlov describes how the centre attracted him back to Russia, more than seven years after he left his native country to work abroad.

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Updates & Corrections

Correction 25 March 2020 : An earlier version of this feature gave the wrong name for the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and incorrectly stated that the Russian Quantum Centre was part of the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology.

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Understanding Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Understanding Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

  • Aaron Stein
  • Maia Otarashvili
  • February 24, 2022
  • Eurasia Program


On February 24, 2022 Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. 

In times of crisis, balanced, in-depth analysis and trusted expertise is paramount. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) remains committed in its mission to provide expert analysis to policy makers and the public on the most pressing foreign policy challenges.

To help you understand this evolving crisis, we have compiled a list of publications, event recordings, and podcasts to help explain current events in Ukraine. FPRI has also included resources about other protracted conflicts, the neighboring Baltic states, and the role of NATO in managing the fallout from the war.

If you have not already done so, be sure to follow the FPRI fellows listed below for further reading and resources. For press inquiries, please contact [email protected]

Russian Aggression in Ukraine & Russian Defense 

  • Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia – February 2023
  • The Confrontation with Russia and US Grand Strategy – February 2023
  • Tanks a Lot (Well, Actually Not That Many for Ukraine) – February 2023
  • Wagner Group Redefined: Threats and Responses – January 2023
  • ‘Let’s Make a Deal’? Ukraine and the Poor Prospects for Negotiations with Putin – January 2023
  • Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – December 2022 
  • How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success – December 2022 
  • Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine – November 2022 
  • Putin’s Philosophers: Reading Vasily Grossman in the Kremlin – November 2022 
  • The Russian-Ukrainian War Triggers an Energy Revolution – September 2022 
  • Ukraine’s Defense Industry and the Prospect of a Long War – September 2022
  • Understanding Russia’s Efforts at Technological Sovereignty – September 2022
  • Watching the War on Russian Television – August 2022
  • War Crimes in Ukraine: In Search of a Response – August 2022
  • Why Russian Elites Are Standing By Putin – July 2022
  • Climate Action Meets Energy Security: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Adds a New Dimension to Energy Transition – June 2022
  • The War’s Impact on Russia’s Economy and Ukrainian Politics – June 2022
  • The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days   – June 2022
  • How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine has Affected Kazakh Politics – June 2022
  • Russia’s Use of Cyberattacks: Lessons from the Second Ukraine War – June 2022
  • What’s Next for Ukraine’s (and its Neighbors’) Domestic and Foreign Policy? – June 2022
  • Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine – May 2022
  • Food Prices, Elections, and the Wagner Group in Africa – April 2022
  • Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes – April 2022
  • Ukraine War Sparks Suspicion over Russia’s Designs on Kazakhstan – April 2022
  • Do Russians Really “Long for War” in Ukraine? – March 2022
  • Kadyrov’s Ukraine Gamble – March 2022
  • Lukashenka’s Fatal Mistake – March 2022
  • What We Can Learn about Russian Strategy from Ivan III – March 2022
  • The Russian Navy in the Russia-Ukraine War Scare – February 2022
  • How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis? – January 2022
  • Moscow’s Compellence Strategy – January 2022
  • Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting – September 2021 
  • Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy – August 2021 
  • Russia’s Forever Wars: Syria and Pursuit of Great Power Status – September 2021
  • Understanding Russia’s Cyber Strategy – July 2021
  • Russia’s Nuclear Strategy: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19 – May 2021
  • Even Thieves Need a Safe: Why the Putin Regime Causes, Deplores, and Yet Relies on Capital Flight for its Survival – November 2021
  • Five Years of War in the Donbas – October 2019 
  • Coal Mines, Land Mines and Nuclear Bombs: The Environmental Cost of the War in Eastern Ukraine – September 2019
  • ​​ Volodymyr Zelensky: Ukraine’s Servant of the People? – September 2019 
  • Russia’s Tragic Great Power Politics – March 2019
  • Ukraine’s Presidential Election and the Future of its Foreign Policy – March 2019
  • Bond of War: Russian Geo-Economics in Ukraine’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring – September 2018
  • The Ukrainian Military: From Degradation to Renewal – August 2018
  • Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023
  • Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – January 2023
  • The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for Azerbaijan – July 2022
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: Uncompromising Objectives and an Uncertain Future – June 2022 
  • The State of Play in Ukraine – May 2022
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: Nukes, Negotiations, and Neutrality – April 2022 
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: Implications for China  – March 2022
  • What the West Needs to Know About Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: Analyzing the Western Military and Economic Response – March 2022
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Humanitarian Crisis and Prospects for Resolution – March 2022
  • Russia’s Long Shadow and the Future of Europe – February 2022
  • Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Will Moscow’s Compellence Strategy Work? – January 2022 
  • Interview with Russian Dissident Ilya & Former Duma Member Ilya Ponomarev – January 2022
  • Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy  – August 2021
  • FPRI Special Briefing: U.S. Sanctions Against Russia – March 2021
  • FPRI Special Briefing: Alexeyi Navalny and U.S.-Russia Relations – February 2021
  • Don’t Mention the War – April 2023
  • Torn in the USA: How Important is the War in Ukraine for the United States? – March 2023
  • Ukraine One Year In: The Helpers – March 2023
  • Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023 
  • Mobilize This – January 2023
  • War in Ukraine: A Firsthand Account – December 2022 
  • Public Opinion in Russia: What Do We Know, What Can We Know? – November 2022
  • Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Strategic Picture – September 2022
  • Russia’s Manpower Conundrum in Ukraine – May 2022
  • The Air War Over Ukraine – March 2022 
  • Debating a No Fly Zone: The Risk of Escalation with Moscow – March 2022
  • Examining Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – March 2022
  • The Risk of War: Russia’s Options for War in Ukraine – February 2022
  • The Risk of War in Ukraine: Moscow’s Military Posture – February 2022
  • Tensions Over Ukraine: Russia’s Rationale for War – February 2022
  • Russian Perceptions of Military AI and Automation – February 2022
  • Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon: Understanding Russia’s ASAT Test – November 2021
  • How Do You Solve a Problem Like Navalny? – September 2021
  • Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Looking Back at the Ukraine Crisis – August 2021
  • Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
  • Learning From Our Adversaries: Russian Aerial Operations in Syria – April 2021

Protracted Conflicts: Moldova and Georgia

  • War As a Neighbor: Moldova and the Challenges of Facing Russian Aggression in Ukraine – April 2023
  • Strategic Connectivity in the Black Sea: A Focus on Georgia – December 2021
  • Taking Stock of U.S. Military Assistance to Georgia – December 2021 
  • Georgia’s Democracy is in Trouble, It’s Time for Closer Engagement – November 2021 
  • Russia’ Permanent War Against Georgia – March 2021
  • Georgia’s Doomed Deep-Sea Port Ambitions: Geopolitics of the Canceled Anaklia Project – October 2020
  • Anatomy of a Fraud: The Moldovan Parliamentary Elections – March 2019
  • Geopolitical Games Expected Ahead of Moldova’s 2018 Elections – October 2017 
  • The Future of US Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities for the Biden Administration – October 2021
  • Tug of War in the Black Sea: Defending NATO’s Eastern Flank – July 2021
  • The Turkish Veto: Why Erdogan Is Blocking Finland and Sweden’s Path to NATO – March 2023
  • Article 5 for the Next Decade of NATO – December 2022 
  • The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape – November 2022 
  • The Baltics Predicted the Suspension of the Ukraine Grain Deal — and Contributed to its Resumption – November 2022
  • Good and Bad Neighbors: Perceptions in Latvian Society – September 2022
  • Europe’s Wait for Turkmen Natural Gas Continues – September 2022 
  • From the Migrant Crisis to Aggression in Ukraine: Belarus is Still on the Baltic Agenda – July 2022 
  • Two Less Obvious Lessons for Baltic Defense from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – June 2022
  • The Baltic Road to Energy Independence from Russia Is Nearing Completion – May 2022
  • America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia – April 2022
  • Baltic Sea Mining as an Extension of the Russian Gray Zone – April 2022
  • The Significance of the Turkish Straits to the Russian Navy – March 2022
  • Fear, Solidarity, and Calls for Further Action in the Baltics as Russia Invades Ukraine – March 2022
  • Latvia’s First Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
  • Turkey’s Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia – February 2022
  • At the Double: Poland’s Military Expansion – January 2022 
  • Turkey’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis – January 2022 
  • Afghanistan was a Turbulent NATO Proving Ground for the Baltic States – December 2021
  • Crowded Pond: NATO and Russian Maritime Power in the Baltic Sea – December 2021 
  • Baltic Perspectives on U.S. and Transatlantic Nuclear Negotiations with Russia – October 2021
  • Namejs vs. Zapad: Military Exercises on Both Sides of the Frontline – September 2021 
  • Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S Foreign Policy – July 2021
  • Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – April 2021
  • Nord Stream 2: Germany’s Faustian Bargain with Gazprom and Why it Matters for the Baltics – December 2020
  • Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
  • America’s Approach to the Three Seas Initiative – May 2021
  • The Baltic States as NATO Heavyweights – March 2023 
  • The Future of European Energy – February 2023
  • What’s Happening With Russian Speakers in Latvia? – January 2023
  • We Can France if We Want To: What Does Paris Want for Ukraine and Europe? – November 2022 
  • Giorgia on My Mind: Italy’s Rightward Turn and Its Implications – October 2022 
  • Stuck in the Magyar: Why is Hungary the “Bad Boy” of Europe? – October 2022 
  • Bloc Party: The EU and the War in Ukraine – September 2022 
  • The View from Ukraine: An interview with Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk – August 2022 
  • What Does Erdogan, Erdo-want? – July 2022
  • Baltic Power Hour – July 2022
  • No More Niinistö Nice Guy: Has Finland’s Security Calculus Changed? – June 2022
  • Swedening the Deal: Stockholm Turns to NATO – June 2022
  • The Energy Trilemma: An interview with Dr. Andrei Belyi – May 2022
  • The Sejm Difference? Poland and the New, Old Europe – May 2022
  • Bundes-where? Germany’s Politics and Security in Changing Times – May 2022
  • Ukrainian Refugees in Latvia: An interview with Agnese Lāce  – April 2022
  • Who Speaks For Eastern Europe? – February 2022
  • Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs on Latvia’s Foreign Policy Challenges – November 2021 
  • Reframing the Baltic states: An Interview with Dr. Andres Kasekamp – October 2021

FPRI Experts to Follow 

  • Rob Lee – @RALee85   Eurasia Senior Fellow, PhD Student at King’s College, London
  • Bob Hamilton – @BobHam88   Black Sea Fellow, Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College  
  • Maia Otarashvili – @MaiaVanRijn Deputy Director of Research
  • Aaron Stein – @aaronstein1  
  • Chris Miller – @crmiller1 Director of Eurasia Program, Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  • Nikolas Gvosdev @FPRI_Orbis   Editor, Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, Captain Jerome E. Levy Chair in Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College
  • Clint Watts – @SelectedWisdom Distinguished Research Fellow , National Security Contributor for NBC News and MSNBC
  • Indra Ekmanis – @indraekmanis Baltic Sea Fellow and Editor of the Baltic Bulletin
  • Una Bergmane @UnaBergmane Baltic Sea Fellow, Researcher at the University of Helsinki
  • Mitchell Orenstein @m_orenstein   Eurasia Senior Fellow, Professor of East European and Russian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
  • Stephanie Petrella @sdpetrella  Eurasia Fellow
  • Sara Ashbaugh @sara_ashbaugh Editor in Chief, BMB Russia
  • Eilish Hart @EilishHart    Eurasia F ellow, Eurasia Program
  • Clara Marchaud @ClaraMarchaud Editor of BMB Ukraine

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Russia’s Crackdown on Independent Media and Access to Information Online

Photo: -/AFP/Getty Images

Photo: -/AFP/Getty Images

Transcript — March 30, 2022

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Marti Flacks: Good morning and welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I’m Marti Flacks, director of the Human Rights Initiative and Khosravi Chair in Principled Internationalism. We are delighted to be co-hosting today’s program with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.

The crackdown on independent media taking place in Russia right now is both symptomatic of a serious deterioration in the human rights and political situations inside Russia as well as a manifestation of a broader pattern of abuse that’s taking place against journalists all over the world. In Russia, government repression of independent media has steadily worsened over the course of the pandemic, the return of Alexei Navalny, and the September 2021 Duma elections. The government has abused public health laws to shut down protests, labeled independent media as foreign agents, and targeted individual journalists for – and outlets for harassment and prosecution. But with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the situation has now become dire.

On March 4th, Putin signed into law a media bill that criminalizes objective reporting about the war in Ukraine; even the use of the word war in describing the situation is prohibited. And those who violate the law face up to 15 years in prison. In response, many independent media outlets have been forced to shut down, more than 150 local journalists are reported to have gone into exile. In an especially heartbreaking development yesterday, Novaya Gazeta, the independent paper founded and led by 2021 Nobel Peace Prize winner Dmitry Muratov, announced it would cease publication until the war ended, after receiving a warning about its reporting from the authorities. Even access to outside media sources have been blocked, with Russians unable to directly access the BBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and other U.S. and European news sources.

The situation in Russia is emblematic of the types of attacks facing independent media all over the world. Freedom House has documented a significant global deterioration in media freedom over the past decade, with new avenues of repression deployed in both authoritarian and some democratic states. And this repression doesn’t just manifest itself in laws and regulations that shut down newspapers and threaten journalists’ jobs, livelihoods, or even freedom. The Committee to Protect Journalists documented the killing of 45 journalists in 2021 and 18 already in 2022, including five this month in Ukraine. But the demonization of independent media and the labeling of journalists as foreign agents or enemies does something more subtle and far more insidious: It undermines trust both in the messenger and in the information. The 2021 Global Edelman Trust Barometer found that trust in all sources of news is at an all-time low around the world, with just half of respondents indicating they believe they can trust traditional media.

Freedom of expression is not just a fundamental human right, it’s the backbone of democracy. An independent media is absolutely critical to the creation and the strengthening of democratic institutions, which is exactly why journalists are targeted by authoritarian regimes. If Russians are to have any chance of having a government thaat is accountable to their needs and their interests, it starts with access to information and to independent media. That’s why I’m so glad that we’re having this discussion today to help us understand what these recent developments mean for the future of independent media in Russia, how citizens will respond to these new restrictions on access to information, and how the crackdown will affect the country’s political direction. And I’m also looking forward to hearing about what the United States and its partners and allies can do to support civil society and freedom of speech in Russia going forward.

So let me briefly introduce our fantastic lineup for today’s event.

Jamie Fly is president and chief executive officer of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Jamie previously served as a senior fellow and co-director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy and director of the Future of Geopolitics and Asia programs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He also served as Counselor for Foreign and National Security Affairs to Senator Marco Rubio, and in the Bush administration at the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Maria Snegovaya is an adjunct senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for New American Security, a postdoctoral fellow in Political Science at Virginia Tech University, and a visiting scholar in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, where she researches Russia’s domestic and foreign policy as well as democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe. She has a long history of collaboration and publication with too many think tanks and media outlets to name.

Daniel Baer is acting director of the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as a diplomatic fellow at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies and served in Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper’s cabinet as executive director of the Colorado Department of Higher Education. Under President Obama he was U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and a deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State Department.

And Vera Zakem is a senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program here at CSIS and a senior technology and policy adviser at the Institute for Security and Technology. She’s also the founder of Zakem Global Strategies. She recently served as a member of the bipartisan Task Force on U.S. Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism, formed by Freedom House, CSIS and the McCain Institute. She also previously led strategy and research at Twitter, leading in scaling initiatives to understand the impact of technology globally.

This is a fantastic lineup with so much insight. And with that introduction, I am so pleased to turn this discussion moderation over to Andrew Lohsen, a fellow in our CSIS Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program.

Andrew, over to you.

Andrew Lohsen: Thank you very much for the introduction, Marti.

At this point I’d like to turn to each of our speakers for some introductory remarks and how they view this unfolding situation.

And as a quick note to the audience, I’d also just like to point out, please feel free to submit any questions via the webpage. There should be a button that says Ask Live Questions Here on the event webpage. And we’ll do our best to answer your questions at the end of the event.

Let’s start with Jamie Fly at RFE/RL. Jamie, can you tell us about some of the restrictions that have been posed on the media – imposed on the media since the start of the war in Ukraine? How do they fit into the Kremlin’s longstanding campaign against free speech and independent journalism? And what is your organization doing in response to these latest attempts to muzzle independent media?

Jamie Fly: Sure. Thanks, Andrew. And it’s great to be with all of you.

So we’ve been dealing with these sorts of restrictions for quite some time inside Russia. We’ve been operating with a formal presence in Moscow for 30 years. We were invited in by Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, at a very different time, obviously, in Russia’s history. But even before the end of the Cold War, we were able to operate on the ground, working with freelancers. By some accounts, by the late ‘80s we had more than a hundred freelancers working with us, despite some of the legal restrictions.

And I just mention that because I think it shows the rather bleak situation that Russia is facing now when it comes to independent media, where I think we’re even going back to a time before the period at the end of the Cold War where there are even more severe restrictions being imposed on independent media outlets.

We’ve been a target of the Kremlin pretty much since Vladimir Putin came to office. Over the years he’s stripped us of our ability to broadcast via traditional radio inside Russia. We lost access to TV relatively early on. And for many years, we were limited to providing news and information using digital means, which has been a growing area for us in recent years. We’ve had great success with digital audiences. And that was the final step that the Kremlin took, starting about a year and a half ago, was to try to impose restrictions on independent outlets operating in the digital space.

That culminated obviously in recent weeks with the blocking of websites, ours and many others, with the effort to block Western social-media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, prevent people from accessing Instagram. So it’s a slow closing of the information space over many years, with the final step playing out in quick succession because of the geopolitics related to the war and the Kremlin’s desire to retain control over any public conversation about the war inside Russia.

So we’re now facing a situation where we’ve had to suspend our physical operations at our bureau in Moscow because of the Kremlin starting bankruptcy proceedings against our Russian entity for our refusal to go along with some previous labeling that they were trying to impose on our content, especially our digital content, and then also the greater risk that any serious journalist faces trying to honestly report inside Russia right now where any real coverage of the war, unfortunately, any potential coverage of political issues, could lead you towards a treason charge and, possibly, 15 years in prison. And so, given that landscape, we had to make that tough decision to suspend our physical operations at our bureau. But what we’re doing is we’re still finding ways to engage with Russian audiences. We’ve relocated some of our journalists outside of the country to our other offices. We still have some contributors inside Russia who are finding ways to share news and information with us that we can then repackage and provide back to our Russian audiences.

And then on the technological front, we’re using advanced circumvention tools – VPNs, mirror websites – and the great thing is despite this blocking, at least in our case in recent weeks, our audiences inside Russia are still at record levels because there is extreme interest in what is going on in Ukraine and because, I think, Russians understand that they’re only getting a small sliver of the true picture.

And so we’ve seen significant adaptation of these circumvention technologies and more people putting in the extra work required now to still access our content online. But that’s going to be an ongoing challenge, I think, for us and any other outlet that is still trying to operate and wants to be able to maintain those ties to our Russian audiences.

Mr. Lohsen: Thanks so much, Jamie. I think that’s a really strong point about the importance of circumvention technologies and I’d like to come back to that at a point later in the discussion.

Let’s speak now to Maria Snegovaya. Maria, it seems that the latest crackdown on independent media and digital freedoms was meant not just to help the Kremlin control the narrative but also to help suppress expressions of dissent as Putin launched a war that seems to, potentially, be quite divisive among Russian citizens.

So, you know, as Putin continues to state that this special military operation is going to plan, we see that his offensive has stalled on several fronts. Casualties are rising. So how long can the Kremlin keep up this narrative before the general population starts to openly question it, and then what happens afterward? Would love to hear your remarks.

Maria Snegovaya: Political scientists are horrible with predicting anything – thank you very much for having me as part of this conversation – so whatever we’re going to be hypothesizing about the future, unfortunately, is likely not to be true.

The whole illustration is quite unprecedented, frankly, and to the extent that we have not faced such a large country ever for the last 80 years, right, committing such an overstep on the international stage but also facing such a serious rebuttal with the sanctions coming from the West so there’s a lot of unknowns here, and right now is not the best moment to forecast what’s going to happen since, for example, even economists – even serious economists are unable to predict all of the economic effects that are going to follow.

So, first of all, what we’re going to say is it’s true that in Russia there are some groups that protested against the war. Those, however, are found among the so-called usual suspects. That is, they’re a sort of smaller share of the Russian society, 15 (percent) to 20 percent that’s usually in opposition to Putin, and many of them supported Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader who’s currently in jail after the regime tried to kill him and poisoned him.

These groups are disproportionately younger, more educated, but they’re also a minority in the Russian society, unfortunately. So those were protesting in the streets of Russia when the war started, and even numbers of those arrested – approximately 20,000 people, according to the estimates – those are quite similar to the numbers that we’ve seen in January 2021 when Navalny was on his hunger strike in jail and people came out to protest. So it’s the same old in a lot of ways. Not much has changed, despite the atrocities that the regime has committed in Ukraine.

Now, what about the majority? The majority are probably 50 to 60 percent of the population in passive, not active – not actively mobilized, but, nonetheless, embrace of the war. You know, trust in polls is a highly debatable issue in Russia, another contested issue among the Russian liberals. They really don’t like – (laughs) – those issues for – to debate. But we’ve, first of all, written about the measures of this state of the Russian society. Second, multiple methodologies, multiple ways to poll the Russian population, different independent pollsters all returning more or less similar results.

Now is 50-60 percent big or not? That’s the question. And it appears while it’s still a majority of the Russian population, right? And that you can – 20 percent maximum, probably, actively disagree and protesting against the war, 50-60 percent in the subtle kind of interact embrace of the war, and then there is also about 20 percent of the population who are uncertain.

So it looks by the look at the Russian TV – Russian propaganda, everything that the previous presenters have already described. But also, almost nonstop propaganda brainwashing that’s coming from the government-funded TV channels. It appears that the Kremlin does not think that the current numbers are sufficient to sustain long-term support for this war. Since the war started, and especially since the regime has realized that the war is going to last must longer than expected, we actually see almost nonstop propaganda coverage on TV channels. All the entertainment content on major TV channels – I’m talking first TV channel and RTR, the second one – they almost nonstop are covering Ukraine situation.

There’s notorious talk shows where essentially state propagandists actually try to explain why Russia is doing everything right in Ukraine. And the interesting change that happened is that in the past, first of all, those shows would usually appear in late afternoon or in the evening. Right now, they start at 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. in the morning and continue nonstop, with small interruptions for news shows. Again, the news are, again, covering Ukraine all the way until after midnight. Now the interesting development is that we do not really see any opposition whatsoever. In the past, there used to be some liberal Russian speakers, some even Ukraine representatives occasionally appearing on those shows.

That’s no longer the case. It’s just nonstop propaganda. And that’s an indication that the regime probably does not believe things are going as well in Ukraine on the ground. Probably it also feels like there needs to be a stronger embrace of the war, or the so-called special operation in Ukraine, as the Kremlin once has to call it, among the Russian society. This brainwashing has spread beyond TV channels. We’ve already discussed that the main social networks have been banned, like Facebook or Twitter. There’s repressive laws against dissenters. You can no longer even support – even call for peace. Even that at this point is considered to be in violation of the state laws.

But interestingly, the new development is a very intensified propaganda in schools, where one of the latest developments is that Maria Zakharova from the MFA and the editor in chief of RT Margarita Simonyan met with schoolteachers in Moscow over Zoom to explain to them how important it is to promote patriotism at this difficult political moment. So overall we see that the propaganda is reaching really, really high levels, probably not because of the regime feels very secure.

The problems, the downsides, right, the possible limitations in the future, to answer Andrew’s question, is, first of all, there is a lack of very well-developed ideology, where a lot of this sort of propaganda would have fit, right? The Kremlin doesn’t really have – offer to the Russian population a vision of the future. It’s mostly a past-based ideology and revanchist ideology. Essentially, we’re defending Russia against outside aggression, and we also sort of recollecting the USSR – although, that’s not directly told, that’s sort of implied. But that, of course, will create limitations in the future because there’s nothing to offer to the Russian population here.

The second of all – the second point I wanted to make when it comes to limitations is that the regime actually fails to mobilize the society around this pro-war narratives. Russian society is generally passive. It’s a characteristic of the society. It’s hard to mobilize around any issues. But we don’t really even see something that was during the Crimea campaign, when a lot of the society rallied around the flag and there were even volunteers willing to go to fight in Donbas. That’s no longer the case. Instead, we see that general mobilization of people is extremely unpopular in Russia, and that will serve as a limitation for the regime. It will not be able to mobilize the Russian society to fight in this war, which will put another constraint.

And last but not the least, the economic well-being so far has been the strongest prediction of support for war. The better off people are and the less they think they will suffer from the war, the more supportive of the war – of the special operation – they appear to be in the polls. Sanctions are targeting this particular vulnerability of the regime. And so as sanctions essentially come into full effect, we are likely to see even this 50 to 60 percent of the Russian society starts doubting the war or the Russian participation in the war.

And I’ll stop here. Thank you.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you, Maria. There’s certainly a lot of challenges ahead.

And I think at this point let’s see if we can go to Vera Zakem to tell us a little bit more about what’s happening with the digital space. Vera, I mean, as broadcasts and print media are closing up shop and suspending operations – they’re no longer covering the war due to some of the latest repressive measures – it seems like being able to access information online is becoming ever more critical for Russians who really want to know what’s happening in the world. So could you walk us through some of the changes that we’re seeing in the digital space, both in terms of some of the new limitations that are set up by the government but also more efforts that are being undertaken by Russian citizens to assess – to access objective information or critical coverage?

Vera Zakem: Absolutely, and thank you so much for having me.

You know, the first thing I actually want to just point out is – and other folks already have touched on this – is that one of the core cornerstones of a free and open society is the ability to have access to free, independent media and have access to credible information. Now, according to Freedom of the Net, as Marti mentioned earlier, Russia has already had very low scores regarding that. But I think what has happened with Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, the ability to access information both in mainstream and on digital platforms and on social media has become extraordinarily really, really challenging.

So, you know, I like to view it as when we – when we talk about countering disinformation and providing folks credible access to information and freedom of expression. It really is the opposite – the different side of the same coin – which is digital authoritarianism, because what we’re actually seeing in Russia is – by Kremlin, by the Russian government – is a form of digital authoritarianism on its citizens to really censor citizens to the type of information that they have and the type of information that they have – that they can consume.

So what has happened, you’ve seen this on multiple fronts, right? Of course, on mainstream you have, as an example, like Novaya Gazeta, they just, you know, decided to close down because of multiple warnings by the Russian government. And what we have seen literally since the start of Russian invasion in Ukraine is a number of platforms, digital platforms – be it Meta/Facebook and Instagram, as well as Twitter and other platforms as well – that they’ve actually stopped, cut down service in Russia, or they have been forced to cut down service because of, for example, in recent weeks there’s been this fake news law that the Russian government has passed to really censor the information that Russian citizens have, and that is really, really troubling and, you know, some folks are really almost dubbing this as a digital Iron Curtain. And what it – what it really shows is the potential for a couple of things.

One is, as these laws are passed and folks in Russia have a very sort of narrow window into the type of information that they consume and they are completely surrounded by the propaganda inside Russia, is this kind of digital sovereignty and digital isolationism. And that is some of the trends that we have to be thinking about right now that may actually go beyond the war itself.

So what are – the Russian citizens are doing? We’ve seen already over the last number of years there have been a number of other platforms within Russia that have arose. Certainly, VKontakte is one example. Most recently since Instagram there’s – Instagram is very, very popular in Russia, and one of the ones that is kind of emerging right now is their version of – they’re calling it Rossgram, right, so it’s kind of a version of their Instagram.

Because there was kind of a vibrant – or there has been a vibrant community that wanted to just – not just share information, just be on social media. But the idea here is that, if you think about where folks get their information, they get it from mainstream news, they get it from social media, and they get it from their friends and family.

So, the filter bubbles are really forming and that kind of free and open space is really, really closing as a result of this war and Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, and the information the Kremlin really wants Russian citizens to see.

So, I think there’s – what I think right now what we’re seeing is a really dangerous precedent for the years ahead that I think the impact of this will be long – much further than the current conflict.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you. Very well noted about the challenge of closing spaces in Russia.

And I’d like to turn to Dan Baer, who can tell us a little bit more about some of the policy options that are available to the United States and to international organizations, the international community broadly, to, you know, contend with this new challenge. Dan is a former deputy assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, a former ambassador from the United States to OSCE. What do you think of as a potential policy response that can be undertaken to help promote these free and open spaces and to support freedom of speech and digital freedoms in Russia?

Dan Baer: Thanks, Andrew. It’s always challenging to come at the end of a such a distinguished panel, and it’s great to be here with Maria, Vera, and Jamie, and to see you all. You always get in the position of saying everything’s been said already, but not by me. But I’m glad to be here.

You know, I was thinking about the policy responses, and unfortunately – I was saying before we got on air – this is a really difficult moment. We’re kind of in between the immediate and the kind of near-term policy responses, and so, I find myself stuck at, kind of, the urgent and the long-term horizon. And I thought I would just frame up kind of five questions that I’ve been thinking on – and I don’t pretend to have the wisest answers to them – but things that I’ve been trying to figure out as I sort through the situation in my mind.

And the first is, kind of, how we think about the problem, and I think thinking about the problem that we’re discussing today it can be important to separate out free media and media freedom from free expression because they are actually separate problems, although deeply linked, of course. And I actually think the prospects for free media are pretty dire in the near-term. But I think free expression, there may be opportunities for creative tapping into expression in Russia in the coming months, and time will tell.

I think it’s also important to point out that freedom of expression is not just about government accountability or criticizing or protesting government, it’s also about telling people that they’re not alone. And in losing so much of the intelligentsia in the last few weeks, as people have fled Moscow and St. Petersburg and elsewhere in Russia, you know, a country has lost its conscience, and that is a deep and profound and lasting loss that I think we’ll be seeing the effects of for quite a long time to come.

Which leads me to how we think about the future – and here I mean long-term future. I guess the bad news is I don’t see any real prospect. As others have highlighted, this is the continuation of a trend – a huge exacerbation – but the continuation of a trend that has been ongoing, and I don’t see any prospect for improvements – real improvements in media freedom in Russia until a post-Putin perestroika. And that doesn’t mean immediately post-Putin – or I’m not naïve in thinking what comes after Putin is necessarily better. But I think it’s hard to imagine progress under the tenure of this leader, and so, I think we have to acknowledge that.

But I think we should look forward to that progress because I think life and history are long, and we should expect that Russia will be part of the international community. We should want that day, and we should be preparing for that day. And we should recognize that that is going to – between where we are now and where we want to be there, there’s a huge psychological challenge.

You know, Maria’s account of kind of where the Russian people are – one of the things that repression does is protect the psychological well-being of people who have bought into a regime that is now committing war crimes, that is now killing people who just a few weeks ago the president was saying were a fraternal people. You know, to move from supporting to condemning that regime is to admit one’s own complicity. And I think we should recognize that there’s quite a long psychological journey for a lot of people to make between here and some kind of freer society in the future.

The third question is kind of how do we get creative in the near term? And all of the stuff that Jamie and Vera have mentioned in terms of opportunities to use technology. I think here too Masha Gessen’s wonderful book, titled “The Future is History,” it’s time to get creative in kind of some old-fashioned ways. And I don’t think the Russians are going to shut – I don’t think Putin’s going to shut down email, for example. I think we should be using email lists. We should be compiling them – particularly of people who have left the country. We should be compiling them from people who are fleeing Ukraine who know people in Russia and sending information about what’s happening on the ground in via email.

I think exploring how we can – how we can support any kinds of campaigns – you know, one of the challenges with freedom of expression, protesting in Russia requires an extraordinary amount of courage. I think it’s worth thinking about whether there are other ways for people to tell each other that they’re not alone that don’t require going out into the streets and holding a sign. Looking for micro-expressions and opportunities to build campaigns around micro-expressions. And we should be supporting the journalists who have fled and making sure that they can continue to tell – to speak with an authoritarian – authoritative voice about what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine, and to comment on what they see and hear from inside Russia.

The fourth question is kind of how we think about the U.S. role, or the role of the – and I think it is important for the U.S. to work through international organizations wherever possible. But I think it’s really important that while we be conscious of the fact that Putin has a special neuralgia, a paranoia – a paranoia and neuralgia about the United States, we shouldn’t let that stop us from doing what’s right. We should be attentive to it and not purposefully provoke, but we should do what’s right in terms of supporting freedom of expression and the free media.

And the last question – the last thing I’ve been thinking about is how we frame the problem. And one of the things that I think we should do is make sure that we’re not only framing this as a human rights problem. The costs that companies are incurring because of the sanctions are directly tied to this long-term trajectory of repression in Russia. It is the internal repression that Putin had cultivated overt the last two decades is directly linked to his external aggression. It is a reason for it.

And we should point out – we should make sure that as we describe the economic costs that responding to Putin’s aggression has imposed not only on people inside Russia but also in Europe and in the United States, that those costs are connected to long-term unaddressed failures of governance, including violations of human rights, including restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of the media. And so we should point out that in other places, where we do take a stand on freedom of expression and free media, we are actually protecting the international order, which is also the order that international commerce depends upon. So those are a few thoughts to finish out the tour de table.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you so much, Dan. I think you raised some really excellent points there. And as we turn more to the moderated discussion, a bit more engagement among the panelists, I’d just like to remind the folks who are tuning in to please feel free to use the “ask a question” button and let us know what you’re thinking of, what you’d like to have the panelists discuss further.

Dan, I really appreciated what you had to say about folks having to acknowledge their own complicity in a regime. And I think there’s a – you know, there’s anecdotal evidence about this cognitive dissonance that you find with a lot of Russians who are consuming the news, who simply cannot believe what’s being reported in Ukraine. And sometimes they’ll even receive phone calls from relatives who are being shelled or bombed, and there’s still this refusal to believe what’s going on.

And so I think that’s a really excellent question to pose. And I’d like to hear some other panelists’ comments on that, is, you know, how do we grapple with this hardening of views? How do we grapple with the cognitive dissonance? And maybe, Jamie, we could turn to you here, how to essentially engage with these passive consumers of the news and try to increase that demand, and engaging skeptical audiences as well?

Mr. Fly: Sure. I mean, that’s something that we’re debating here at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on a daily basis across all of our various platforms that are engaging Russian audiences.

I’ll just say, from our experience – I mean, I think Maria noted the issues with the surveys, and I think there probably is a majority of citizens inside Russia that are at least passively supporting the Kremlin narrative. We have seen, through a diversity of opinions in the street interviews that we’re still able to do. This was easier, obviously, before the recent developments.

But if you look even – and we’ve published a lot of these, including with English subtitles – the natural response from most Russians we talk to, not just in cities but as we surveyed people across the country as the military buildup was occurring and as there was the talk of possible war against Ukraine, more often than not. the response was almost astonishment at the prospect of war with Ukraine. People repeatedly would say similar things like why would we go to war against Ukraine? My cousin lives in Ukraine. My aunt or uncle live in Ukraine. I have this personal connection to Ukraine.

So I just – I mention that – that was just striking to us across Russia as we surveyed people in the early phase of this. We got a lot of that response. Now, we’ve also done a lot of other so-called vox pops where, even when presented with evidence of what is happening in Ukraine, people are just in absolute denial. They don’t want to engage. They don’t want to hear it.

And so I think there has been a hardening of public opinion amongst a certain segment of society. And then we’re also now dealing with that challenge which Dan highlighted, where we do have – we don’t have the exact estimates, but we have significant numbers of Russians just voting with their feet and leaving. And so that – many people who may have been open to a certain message may actually have just decided that it’s not worth it and they’re going to at least live out the next several months, if not the next few years, somewhere else, in a better situation for their families.

And so that, I think, requires all of us who do want to engage those who remain to rethink what our programming looks like, what messages that we are sharing with them. We can’t necessarily just do the same things that we’ve been doing in recent years. And so we’re taking a significant relook at what types of programming we make available to Russians inside Russia and trying to connect with them on a variety of levels.

The one thing I’ll highlight that has been successful for us in recent years is that there are always – in every society, even in democracies, there’s a certain segment of the public that don’t care about politics. They just want to live their lives. They do, though, care about topics that touch them on a daily basis, that interact with their families – the environment, health care, sometimes social policy, education policy. And we’ve had great success doing journalism related to those topics, which are not just involving a certain message about Vladimir Putin every day or Kremlin policy, but focusing on things that people care about in their day-to-day lives.

Now, some of that, I think, has been set aside just by the focus on the war in recent weeks. But I think we and others will likely need to return to that, because I think there are still ways that you can highlight the broader impacts of the war on Russia’s economy, the broader governance issues, which the Putin regime has struggled with for years in terms of actually resolving problems for people at a local level. And so that’s one area that we’ve had great success that I think we’ll want to do more of going forward.

Mr. Lohsen: Maria, maybe I could turn to you for a comment here. I’m curious. I mean, it seems that quite often the Russian government has depended on setting an example of those who violate the law. I mean, we see this 15-year prison term that’s been introduced for those who may violate the law against so-called fake news about the Russian military operation, about the Russian defense sector.

I mean, should we be expecting some sort of example to be set, some criminal penalties to be levied against journalists who still dare to just talk about the situation in Ukraine objectively? Or has that – are we seeing a new shift in the way that Russia is approaching enforcement?

Dr. Snegovaya: I mean, we – it’s always left to selective impressions, right, the way the state government approaches this issue – the government approaches these issues. We’ve seen that back in 2014-15, that’s not fundamentally. We do not see a wider, like, scale of repression. That’s not a terror yet, but the dynamic is extremely unfavorable. But it’s also quite predictable, right, given everything that we’ve known about how this regime operates during these times.

I just wanted to add to something that’s been said before about the general state of the Russian society since I’ve written specifically recently about that and the cognitive dissonance that Russians have, even when presented with direct evidence. I think that Jamie has mentioned that. They refuse to believe it, even when that evidence comes from trusted sources like, for example, a father is presented this evidence from his daughters who live in Ukraine. And here, unfortunately, we’re facing a much more problematic situation. It’s not the lack of knowledge, like was the situation back in the Soviet times, for example; it’s active resistance to know because knowledge has too many implications that are unpleasant, that are painful, that take you out of your comfort zone, and also, to some extent, challenge your identity.

Right said, if you know that your country has committed atrocities in Ukraine, first of all, you are no longer the good, liberating Soviet soldier – like, representative of the Soviet, less Russian population that’s always right and always does the right deed, never questions of what it does. But it also puts some of the responsibility on you to act in some way, and that’s what the Russian society has been deliberately trying to avoid for many years. It’s a passive acceptance for a regime’s actions especially when it comes to something abstract, something that does not concern them personally, which came to be – primarily be associated to the realm of foreign policy.

In Russia, Putin is not really credited with combating corruption or even achieving economic progress anymore, unlike what used to be the case in 2000s. Where he’s still given credit is in the realm of foreign policy, that he is able to make the Russia great again – make Russia great again and achieve all these great things on the international stage. There, ordinary Russians sort of delegate all of the responsibility for foreign policy realm to the president and does not really concern him or herself much with that. The state tends to be right in that regard. That’s also where Russians get the sense of unity, unlike Ukrainians, for example, where the nation comes from similar values shared by individuals, each and every individual. In Russia, it’s more that the state tends to unite the Russian society over this framework of the great Russia, and that’s where essentially Russia’s version of, if you will, post-imperial nationalism comes from.

So there’s a lot of deep problems sociologically and psychologically, serious deep issues associated to the way Russians view their – what the country does in the international stage, which makes it very hard to fight it by just trying to tell them the truth. They know the truth. They can access the truth. They just don’t want to know it.

And here, coming back to what has been said by Jamie, it really – where I think we have a chance to change the views is where the issues concern them personally. I already mentioned that the embrace for war tends to decrease dramatically among people who feel that they’re economically affected in an active way by war consequences. And I think there will be chance to specifically demonstrate to them how they’re personally affected by the bad decisions made by the government. That opportunity will come when they really feel the effect of the sanctions. Right now the sanctions work but – and the prices have been skyrocketed – have skyrocketed, but not fully, not to a large extent. It’s not really felt like a deep, serious crisis.

And this is where I have to agree: They will have to connect everything that’s going on to the matters that concern them personally. It’s the society that does not – is not going to – concern with some abstract sufferings of some, I don’t know, people somewhere, especially when this knowledge challenges their integrity, based on, as I said, these beliefs in Putin restoring Russia’s great-power status. So in a lot of ways this is a much, much more serious challenge and it might require some engagement with cognitive psychological approaches in order to be able to effectively reach to ordinary Russians and finally make them realize what is going on in Ukraine.

Mr. Lohsen: Maria, I think you raise a really, really strong point there, and I think that, you know, one thing that’s really striking to me is that it – we’re seeing this increase in harsh rhetoric from Putin himself about essentially splitting society into those who support the war and those who are “scum” or “traitors” or fifth columnists, and I’d really be curious to hear some of the panelists’ thoughts on, you know, what this means not only for the operating environment for journalists but also just kind of giving that cognitive space for Russians to start to think about politics in a different way.

Are we seeing this, you know, kind of enforcement of a closed space where we’re now having a certain opinion on the war is starting to come with very significant and, potentially, dangerous political baggage just for the ordinary Russian citizen?

Dan or Vera, I’d love to hear your thoughts on this, if you’d like to jump in.

Ms. Zakem: Yeah. I’ll jump in just real quickly. You know, I think it’s extraordinarily dangerous for the Russian citizens and I think some of what Jamie and, you know, Maria also commented of the fact that there’s real fear. So even if folks, you know, do not agree with what Kremlin is doing there’s real fear in speaking up. So is the decision made to just kind of, like, ride out this period? Because, as you have mentioned, you know, there’s, potentially, if you’re a journalist or, quite frankly, it could be also a human rights defender or a dissident or anyone who speaks up someone can go to jail.

And so – and I think we do have, you know, this now opportunity to really try to reach – two things, to reach people in a creative way and to show them, try to get sort of the truth out to them but show them also – relate it to matters that really impact them, as folks have already said, right, whether it’s the health issues, it is the economy, and I think, over time, sanctions will definitely have its effect as well.

So I think it is trying to reach out, you know, sort of the creative way as well. So that is why I think that when we think about engagement, whether – you know, Dan, you rightly mentioned email, and then also other forms and mediums, different kind of strategic campaigns that we can do to show, you know, that what the Kremlin regime is doing, what the Kremlin is doing, this is – it’s not just a matter of this is not right but this is not really what’s going on, and what you’ve seen now is the international community is really, really strongly behind Ukraine.

So I think it’s really about a strategic engagement and very creative engagement to show people the truths and see the impact that this, potentially, already has and may have in the long run for the Russian citizens.

Dr. Baer: Andrew, I just want to – two points there. On your point about kind of the change in rhetoric, I mean, I think that was, to me, the most striking thing about the speech that Putin gave on the eve of the war. Just – you know, I’m used to the Russian kind of foreign policy speeches that pervert and twist U.N. language to construct some kind of cynical legal justification for various things and, frankly, the complaints about NATO and stuff like that, and I think one of the things that that speech revealed is just how much of – that it’s only a slight exaggeration to say that NATO is a red herring in all of this and how much of this is much deeper.

The speech that he gave on the eve of the war was, clearly, directed at an older Russian audience. It was, clearly, rooted in history, and when I say history I don’t mean the 1990s. I mean the 1920s. And it was filled with deep loathing and derision for Ukraine and its right to exist and it was a different tone. I’m not saying that he’s never appealed to history before but it was just – it was seething, and I think that is very terrifying and it goes to, you know, part of what Maria was saying about the identity piece of this as well. And you know, if you’re rooted in that history and there’s some claim made and you’re – you’ve been told that an action is a validation of that history, then to give up support for that action is to invalidate your own history and, you know, that challenges people’s sense of identity. By the way, we see that in our own country in some of the debates around, say, CRT right now.

But the other piece about this is, I think, one of the things we haven’t mentioned so far – we’ve alluded to it – is that one of the things that we can do is continue to strengthen the sanctions. There has to be – the initial shock of the sanctions is starting to wear off. Markets are starting to price them in. They are going to have less effect over – sanctions always have less effect over – the effect of sanctions lessens over time as people figure out workarounds and substitutions, et cetera. And so it’s really important that the international community – and here it’s the United States, Europe, as well as other G-7 countries – that they continue to impose more sanctions. There should be more banks that are banned from SWIFT. There should be more consequences that are delivered that make the sanctions pinch in the lives of middle-class Russians so that they are spurred to rethink their support for this war.

Mr. Lohsen: Thanks, Dan. I think those are all excellent points.

And at this point, I would like to turn to some audience questions since we’re at about the 10-minute mark and we have a couple that have come in that are really excellent. One of the – I really like this one, which is from Joe Morley , asking essentially how – should we be focusing the messaging? Should the West, in its attempts to try to establish more objective information about what’s happening, should we also be focusing our messaging more on nonaligned countries or countries that are, you know, other than Russia – so, for example, India, African states – to try to correct some of the narratives that Russia has been propagating, fueling external support for the war?

Ms. Zakem: I can just jump in here for a second and then if –

Mr. Lohsen: Sure.

Ms. Zakem: You know, absolutely. I mean, we see the Kremlin playbook being used extensively all over the world, certainly in emerging markets, including, you know, Africa, including Latin America, including India to try to influence targeted populations both internally within those countries and externally as part of, if you will, the alliance and geopolitical alliance. So I think this is – as part of Dan was so rightly to point out how, you know, in terms of the importance of sanctions in part of building this broader and expanding that coalition, if you will, and this broader international community coalition. It’s sort of antiwar and supporting Ukraine. And in thinking about the messaging I think it’s really, really important that we also, the broader international community, engages with those countries as well, just because Russian government reach is far and wide and it goes much beyond Ukraine or Europe or the former Soviet Union states.

Mr. Lohsen: Maybe I’ll switch to another audience question now, which is from Sofia Hayes. She’s asking about the corporate role, noting that Twitter had announced in early March that they would comply with EU sanctions and restrict Russian state media in Europe. The question is: To what extent have these actions been effective at limiting disinformation in Europe? And what more could Twitter be doing to curb disinformation elsewhere?

Would also love to hear some additional thoughts on, you know, the future of these social media companies in Russia. Is there – is there a potential way for them to go back in a way that is responsible and not selling out the Russians’ right to free speech?

Jamie or Dan, maybe you guys could tackle this one.

Mr. Fly: I’m happy to start.

So I think from our perspective the social media platforms play an important role. You know, during the Cold War we used radio transmitters to access our audience, and I always say now that the social media platforms are essentially our modern radio transmitters. The problem is, with our radio transmitters for the most part we owned them, maintained them. We could adjust them as necessary to reach the audience in different ways. And with the social media platforms, yes, we can have great digital teams that have the right strategies, but the reality is we have very little control over the nuts and bolts of how we’re accessing and interacting with the audience because the social media platforms have such immense power as they design the algorithms and make policy decisions, then, in different markets.

So one challenge we have across the board – and Russia has been one of those countries where we occasionally have had concerns that the Kremlin has gamed the system to a certain extent. When all of the platforms were accessible inside Russia, they often would respond to various requests from people inside Russia or complaints about our accounts. We’d occasionally get our accounts locked out, so that was a running challenge that we’ve had, and not just in Russia but in other countries as well.

I think it’s good that the platforms that were blocked took a stand. They, obviously, did not go along with the censorship. And the one that we’re all now watching is YouTube, which is the last major remaining Western platform that has yet to be blocked, although I think people have been predicting in the last couple weeks that it will be blocked at any moment. YouTube is a vital lifeline for us and many other news outlets to reach our audiences. It’s also wildly popular inside Russia, not just for news and information. So it’ll be interesting to see what happens there.

But I think the companies in general have taken the right stand in the last several weeks, and so given the broader environment that we’ve been discussing, I really don’t know how they will be able to return to the market anytime soon without fundamentally compromising the principles that they’ve now put out in response to these censorship demands. But they do play an important role. And I think anything they can do, as well as other tech companies in general, to support circumvention efforts, to make sure that circumvention tools work well with their platforms, that will be incredibly useful.

And I think the one good note I’d end on there is we’ve still seen with Facebook, Instagram – we’ve seen a lot of use continuing from Russia, even from those affiliated with the Kremlin who are still posting on their Instagram accounts despite the fact that it’s supposedly banned. And so I think anything that companies can do to further those efforts at circumvention and raise more awareness in Russian society about how to access blocked content, that would help us all.

Mr. Lohsen: All right. And then the final question that I’ll – that I’ll ask among the audience questions is from Adam Hilchesky (ph). He wants to know: Is there an effort to organize the Russian diaspora in a way that was done in Poland last year with – to support the continuing broadcast of the TVN channel? You know, is there – is that consolidating – are we seeing a move among – a movement among the Russians who have left and voted with their feet, and also long-standing diaspora communities to support the continued independence of free media, and to support in general the exchange of ideas?

Maria, perhaps I could turn to you here for this one.

Dr. Sengovaya: Yes, thank you. That’s an important question. Definitely there is such an effort. So Russian society suffers from lack of uniting values. I mentioned that in the past. And it’s actually just to haunt Russian diaspora abroad as well. It was very hard to organize, because the people just really very much disagreed in their vision of political social future for Russia. That’s no longer the case. If there’s anything positive to say about this current wave of immigration it’s that people who are fleeing they tend to be this pro-Western, liberal-minded pro-democracy Russians, who just don’t find that they have any future in Russia in the current situations anymore.

So in that regard, it’s easier to unite them. And there were a number of initiatives, including organizing some, I don’t know, media – some platforms where they could all connect. Or think tanks, like Free Russia Foundation, for example, that operate in the United States, but also Georgia, also Ukraine, attempted to do that. There is also an attempt by Navalny’s colleagues who have left the country and currently trying to create the – again, unite Russian diaspora. Many of them have met – they visited D.C., New York, and met with many people there.

It's not very clear what’s going to come out of it, because it’s also important to have some vision for the future, right? Right, so you have all these people, but what it is that they can do, right? Can they outreach to their relatives in Russia? Can they try and influence them? That’s, I think, the bigger challenge. So far we’ve got this antiwar committee where some of the Navalny’s team members, but also other opposition leaders like Garry Kasparov have joined and signed this antiwar statement. So this is all in development. And I think that’s one of the ways in which Russian civil society can move further.

Unfortunately, like, previous experience, it’s not very encouraging in this regard. But as I said, there’s also policy signs when it comes to at least the unity of values among these people that many of the previous waves of immigration lacked. Thank you.

Mr. Lohsen: Thanks, Maria. We’re running right up against the end of our time here, so maybe what I’ll do is just ask all the speakers to give a brief 20 to 30 seconds on what you’re watching next when it comes to the future of media and freedom of speech in Russia.

Dr. Baer: I’ll jump in. (Laughs.) I mean, I think I’m watching the future of the platforms in the very near term. And one of the things – I agree very much with what Jamie said. One of the things that I think we should think about from this experience is that the platforms themselves actually don’t want to be judge and jury on how to make these decisions. And we need better agreed principles about what they can use as external reference to make good, decent decisions about what to do in hard cases. This won’t be the last one. And I think a lot of them were flying by the seat of their pants looking for references in international law and stuff like that. And, you know, I think they have made good decisions, broadly speaking. But I think we should try to learn from this experience.

And then, you know, the second thing is, looking at whether or not those who have fled are able to become – those who have fled, the brain drain, are able to become – to maintain a role outside of their homeland as the conscience of a country, because I think it’s really important that that happens, because at some point the brain is going to have to go back. And we should all want that for Russia’s future.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you, Dan.

I’ll leave this one as a jump ball if anybody else wants to jump in real quick and let us know what you’re watching next.

Ms. Zakem: Yeah, just a 10-second echo. I totally agree with Dan. I am very much watching – Jamie, also what you said – what’s going to happen with YouTube and how digital platforms are going to be dealing with this, first and foremost, because they have been a voice to provide, whether we think about, broadly speaking, sort of their – whether they’re countering disinformation or not. But they have been a voice in Russia and a lot of other states in the former Soviet Union and Europe.

So how that gets handled, whether they’re going to – for example, YouTube, in this case, is going to be shut down, how they’re going to be operating inside the country. It really, really remains to be seen; and then how, ultimately, at the end of the day, how we, as the international community, as the United States, also how can we really provide these kinds of creative campaigns and really foster these creative voices and creative campaigns to get the truth and to get credible information to the population.

Dr. Snegovaya: I think that it’s very important to see how the dynamic of the approval for the government actions change when the sanctions hit. So we’ve discussed the policies – people are afraid to answer maybe about the war at this point. But they – there will be subtle signs, indications, for example, of whether the country is moving in the right direction. And so far you see that the polls – the – first, the perceptions are improving so far.

The opening, as I said before, for outreach to the Russian population will come when they see decline starting to happen. And that’s probably unavoidable, given the scale of sanctions. Despite all the adjustments, right, there is a big blow that the Russian economy has suffered. And there will be this moment. At that time, it’s important to watch that situation.

And I have to say that despite all of the blockings of the social media that we’ve discussed here, the demand for knowledge is big. And you can see, like – like I say, they’ve locked Echo of Moscow, so now Echo of Moscow, every journalist – former Echo of Moscow journalist has his or her own show on YouTube, which has very large following. And, for example, Venediktov, the editor in chief of Echo of Moscow, had to block his Telegram account when he left Echo of Moscow, but he had to create new – a new Telegram account, which now has twice as many followers as his old account had.

So from that perspective there are current trends in the Russian society, not all of them necessarily negative. That’s a matter of really watching for these openings when they emerge and trying to sort of use them.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you, Maria.

Jamie, any last words from you?

Mr. Fly: Yeah, just to echo Maria there. I mean, our experience over more than 70 years of broadcasting, including into the Russian audiences in the Soviet Union, is exactly what Maria said, that people are always hungry for information. Yes, they’re susceptible to propaganda, but only to a certain extent. And over time, I think people eventually start to realize that something is off. They start to seek out other sources. And I think that’s the challenge the Kremlin is going to face, not just related to the messaging about the war, but also now the economic consequences of the war.

And so what I’m watching is will we be able to extend beyond the early adopters, especially of circumvention technology, the people who are already familiar with VPNs and how to access outside information that was blocked, and will we be able to reach broader segments of society over time who need to be educated about those tools and actually put in the effort now to seek out information? The early trends are very positive from that perspective, but I think that’s going to be the big challenge going forward for those of us who are committed to still providing the truth to the Russian people.

Mr. Lohsen: Thank you very much.

Jamie Fly, Dan Baer, Vera Zakem, Maria Snegovaya, all amazing comments. Thank you so much for joining us today and sharing your thoughts on this very important issue. That brings us to the end of our time, a little bit over it. Thank you very much for staying with us for an extra couple of minutes as we rounded off the discussion.

Always happy to see you here at CSIS. And for those of you who are still watching, on April the 12th CSIS will host another event on the implications of the war in Ukraine for the Caucasus and Central Asia. That’ll be hosted by Jeff Mankoff, senior associate here with CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. Thank you so much for joining us, everybody, and have a nice day.

Russia and the Soviet Union: A Syllabus of Background Readings

These readings from our archive provide context for the developing conflict in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin attend an inauguration ceremony for Putin May 7, 2000 in the Kremlin in Moscow.

It is the early hours of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. No one knows what will happen next, but we hope the following stories from our archives will help readers understand the military, economic, and geographic history that has preceded this moment, and provide the resources and context for teachers and students in the days ahead. As always, JSTOR Daily links to JSTOR sources offer free access to all readers.

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Russian History

Serfdom in Russia

How American Slavery Echoed Russian Serfdom


The February Revolution: Why Didn’t They Shoot?

Iron Curtain

Revisiting Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

Siege of Leningrad

The Nazis’ Nightmarish Plan to Starve the Soviet Union

Black and white photograph of the Postdam Conference group from 1945

Potsdam and the Origins of the Cold War

Soviet Hippie

The Unlikely Hippies of the USSR

Workers sit in the control room of reactor number two inside the former Chernobyl nuclear power plant

Chernobyl’s Control Room Is Open for Tourists

Russian/ussr leadership.

Peter the Great cutting a Boyar's beard

Peter the Great’s Beard Tax

Profile portrait of Catherine II by Fedor Rokotov (1763)

The Memoirs of Catherine The Great

Stalin poster

What Do We Really Know about Joseph Stalin?

Was russia destined to be an autocracy, censorship and human rights.

Nikolai Vavilov in prison

The Weed Scientist Who Brought Down the Wrath of Stalin

A book opened to the title page of Dr. Zhivago

Why Boris Pasternak Rejected His Nobel Prize

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How a Forbidden Russian Epic Finally Got Published

Photograph: A Russian orphan in Kiev during the famine. Her parents died from starvation and she survives on charity from a neighbour. 1934

Memorializing Life Under Soviet Terror

International relations.

People wait for trains on the platform at Kyiv train station on February 28, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Ukraine, Russia, and the West: A Background Reading List

NATO headquarters meeting

NATO Survives its Identity Crisis

Andrei Maximov via Flickr

The Real Meaning Behind Russia’s Eurovision Controversy

Harem Pool Jean-Léon Gérôme [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

The Other Orientalism: Colonialism in the Caucasus

A swarm of locusts by Emil Schmidt

How the Soviet Union Turned a Plague into Propaganda

A pinned map indicating Kaliningrad

Kaliningrad for Beginners

Estonian flag pinned into a globe showing the location of Estonia

How Singing Started a Revolution in Estonia

Illustrated imagining of American and Soviet spacecrafts docking from 1973.

Space Is The Place: The US, USSR, and Space Exploration

Russian oil

When Russia Conquered the World with White Oil

Teenagers in a Siberian village near Lake Baikal

The New Siberians

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G. Legman and the Bawdy Eclectic

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Combustible Cinema? The Nitrate Film Issue

Four versions of Hokusai's Great Wave, from the Art Institute of Chicago, LACMA, Tokyo National Museum, and British Museum

Under Hokusai’s Great Wave

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Senior US official warns of security threat amid reports of Russian nuclear capability in space

Republican House intelligence chair, Mike Turner, says Biden officials should declassify information about threat, while House speaker Mike Johnson says there was no need for panic

The head of the House intelligence committee, Mike Turner, has called for the Biden administration to declassify information on what he called a “serious national security threat”, which was later reported to involve Russian plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space.

In his statement, Turner, an Ohio Republican, gave no details about the supposed security threat.

Talking to reporters at the White House later on Wednesday, the national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, expressed surprise at Turner’s statement saying he was due to meet the “gang of eight” (congressional leaders with special security clearance for classified briefings) on Thursday. But Sullivan did not give any details of the planned meeting.

ABC News and the New York Times cited unnamed sources as saying that the security threat Turner was referring to involved Russia’s potential deployment of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon in space. The New York Times said US allies had also been briefed on the intelligence, which was not deemed to represent an urgent threat, as the alleged Russian capability was still in development.

It is not clear whether the new intelligence alert is connected to a Russian launch on 9 February of a Soyuz rocket carrying a classified defence ministry payload.

“Russia has been conducting several experiments with manoeuvring satellites that might be designed to sabotage other satellites,” Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists, said. He pointed out that any such deployment of nuclear weapons in space would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, to which Moscow is a signatory.

“The issue is not so much about an increased nuclear weapons threat per se but that it would increase the threat against other countries’ space-based nuclear command and control assets. It would be highly destabilising.”

Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russian nuclear forces , said: “I am very skeptical (to put it mildly). Unfortunately, it’s impossible to categorically rule out anything these days. But still, I don’t think it’s plausible.”

Kristensen suggested that a Russian threat to put nuclear weapons in space, thus destroying yet another non-proliferation treaty, could be the latest in a long line of Vladimir Putin’s moves designed to add to pressure on the US and its allies to end their military support for Ukraine.

Daryl Kimball, the head of the Arms Control Association, said a nuclear anti-satellite weapon made little practical sense.

“You don’t need a nuclear weapon to blow up a satellite in orbit. All objects in space are so delicate, that you can do something with much less than a nuclear detonation,” Kimball said. “Plus, it’s completely illegal.”

The House speaker, Mike Johnson, said there was no need for panic over the alleged, unnamed threat. He said he was not allowed to discuss classified information but told reporters: “We just want to assure everyone steady hands are at the wheel. We’re working on it and there’s no need for alarm.”

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Putin Complains About Lack of Piercing Questions From Tucker Carlson


FILE PHOTO: Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during an interview with U.S. television host Tucker Carlson in Moscow, Russia February 6, 2024. Sputnik/Gavriil Grigorov/Kremlin via REUTERS/File Photo

(Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin says he was surprised by a lack of sharp questions from U.S. television host Tucker Carlson in an interview that made headlines around the world last week.

Putin told a Russian TV interviewer, Pavel Zarubin, that he had wanted Carlson to behave more aggressively, which would have given him the right to reply just as pointedly.

"To be honest, I thought that he would behave aggressively and ask so-called sharp questions. I was not just prepared for this, I wanted it, because it would give me the opportunity to respond in the same way," Putin said in comments broadcast on Wednesday.

In his first interview with an American journalist since before Russia's invasion of Ukraine nearly two years ago, Putin subjected Carlson to a half-hour lecture on history.

The Latest Photos From Ukraine

BAKHMUT REGION, UKRAINE - NOVEMBER 3: The Ukrainian military fires RPGs at enemy positions as the special military unit "Kurt & Company group" hold the first line of the frontline Russian-Ukrainian war on November 3, 2023 in Bakhmut District, Ukraine, the frontline of the Russian Ukrainian war. Ukrainian forces continue to fight to retake Bakhmut, which was captured by Russian forces in May, following a yearlong war battle. Over the summer, Ukraine regained territory north and south of Bakhmut but Russia has held the city itself. (Photo by Kostya Liberov/Libkos/Getty Images)

He told Zarubin he was surprised that Carlson had not interrupted him more.

Photos You Should See

Drum majors from the Mississippi Valley State University marching band parade down Jackson Ave during the traditional Krewe of Zulu Parade on Mardi Gras Day in New Orleans, Tuesday, Feb. 13, 2024. (AP Photo/Matthew Hinton)

"Frankly, I did not get full satisfaction from this interview," Putin said.

The Kremlin said Putin had agreed to the Carlson interview because the approach of the former Fox News host differed from the "one-sided" reporting of the Ukraine conflict by many Western news outlets.

(Writing by Maxim Rodionov; Editing by Sandra Maler)

Copyright 2024 Thomson Reuters .

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  1. Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations

    Updated April 15, 2021 Congressional Research Service R46761 Congressional Research Service SUMMARY Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations Since Russian President Vladimir Putin's rise to leadership more than 20 years ago, tensions have increased steadily between Russia and the United States.

  2. The future of research collaborations involving Russia

    In the Nature Index database, for example, which tracks affiliations in research articles across 82 high-quality science journals, Russia's overall share of affiliations jumped by almost 10%...

  3. Untangling the Russian web: Spies, proxies, and spectrums of Russian

    This four-part issue brief reviews the complex web of cyber actors in Russia, analyzes the range of Russian government involvement with these actors through specific examples, explains the risks and benefits the Kremlin perceives or gets from cultivating and leveraging this web of cyber actors, and provides three key takeaway-action pairings for...

  4. Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context

    RAND Research & Commentary Expert Insights Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context A Reassessment by Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Olesya Tkacheva, Scott Boston Related Topics: Economic Development, Global Security, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Political Reform Movements, Russia, Ukraine Citation

  5. JOItmC

    This study was aimed at developing a cognitive—econometric model for assessing the effectiveness of the current governmental policies to support enterprises in Russia in the context of pandemic propagation. Using the Granger test and correlation analysis, we formed a system of key indicators that characterizes the economic development of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) in Russia ...

  6. Bureaucratic reform and Russian transition: the puzzles of policy

    Considering the unsatisfying amount of research available on Russia's bureaucratic reform process, this paper aims to contribute to the discussion of the causal processes underlying the ...

  7. Russia Foreign Policy Papers

    2020 Russia's Struggle to Gain Influence in Southeast Asia - Russia Foreign Policy Papers - Bennett Murray - August, 2020 The Role of the Military in Russian Politics and Foreign Policy Over the Past 20 Years - Orbis, Russia Foreign Policy Papers - Anna Borshchevskaya - July, 2020

  8. (PDF) Science and innovation policy of the Russian government: A

    Th is paper explores the state and pace of the development of science and innovation policy in Russia with the goal of fi nding an explanation for its relatively slow progress.

  9. PDF Janis Kluge Mounting Pressure on Russia's Government Budget

    Janis Kluge Mounting Pressure on Russia's Government Budget Financial and Political Risks of Stagnation SWP Research Paper 2 February 2019, Berlin Abstract Economic stagnation and demographic change in Russia are putting intense pressure on the government budget. Tax revenues have been declining since the late 2000s.

  10. Characteristics of Russian Government Financial Resources ...

    The research data in this paper is drawn from official statistical sources on budgets of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Previous research of financial relations in different economic periods by national and foreign scholars was analyzed. 3 Results

  11. Russia aims to revive science after era of stagnation

    In 2018, Putin approved a national research strategy that stretches to 2024. It calls for more money, extra support for early-career scientists, and some 900 new laboratories, including at least...

  12. Russian government quality award: 25 years towards organizational

    Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review the Russian Federation Government Quality Award (RFGQA) over its 25-year existence. Design/methodology/approach This paper looks into the evolution ...

  13. Understanding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

    Fear, Solidarity, and Calls for Further Action in the Baltics as Russia Invades Ukraine - March 2022. Latvia's First Response to Russia's War in Ukraine - March 2022. Turkey's Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia - February 2022. At the Double: Poland's Military Expansion - January 2022.

  14. PDF Latest analyses of Russia's war on Ukraine

    Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine's neutrality, but added that Moscow would still achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrender or accept Russian ultimatums.

  15. (PDF) The Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

    For my International Studies Senior Thesis, I decided to focus on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, explore the root causes of the conflict, analyze the events and circumstances that led...

  16. E-Government Research Domain: Comparing the International and Russian

    It is suggested that the global e-government represents a coherent field, although further integration between research contexts is important, and the Russian e- government research is lagging behind, due to low internationalization and few stimuli for knowledge production. Positioning e-government as a discipline is a matter of continuous discussion, and it remains topical to estimate its ...

  17. PDF Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy

    the Ukrainian government's efforts to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity. For related information, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia; CRS In Focus IF11138, Russia's Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany; and CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces. R45008 October 5, 2021 Cory Welt Specialist in Russian and

  18. Russia's Crackdown on Independent Media and Access to ...

    The crackdown on independent media taking place in Russia right now is both symptomatic of a serious deterioration in the human rights and political situations inside Russia as well as a manifestation of a broader pattern of abuse that's taking place against journalists all over the world. In Russia, government repression of independent media ...

  19. Updated February 2, 2022 Russian Cyber Units

    The U.S. government has indicted and imposed sanctions on Russian security personnel and agents for various cyberattacks. Congress may be interested in Russian agencies, units, and their attributes to better understand why and how Russia conducts cyber operations. Early Russian Cyber Operations

  20. Russia and the Soviet Union: A Syllabus of Background Readings

    Russia and the Soviet Union: A Syllabus of Background Readings. These readings from our archive provide context for the developing conflict in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin attend an inauguration ceremony for Putin May 7, 2000 in the Kremlin in Moscow. The icon indicates free access ...

  21. Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects

    Congressional Research Service SUMMARY Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and ... occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.2 1 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are ad hoc, task-specific formations designed to operate autonomously as combined arms formations. BTGs are built around infantry and armor units, with supporting ...

  22. Research

    The objectives of this research are as follows: to investigate the main methods of corrupting the media and the journalists that the Russian government has employed; to trace the effects that such corruption can have on media content and, as a result, on public opinion; and to determine whether the few free media can contribute to overcoming ...

  23. The surprising resilience of the Russian economy

    The significant increase in military expenditure marks "a striking break with Russia's post-Communist development to date", a recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI ...

  24. 'No hope for science in Russia': the academics trying to flee to the

    Sat 2 Apr 2022 03.30 EDT P rof John Duggan*, a climate scientist at a Russell Group university, had a Zoom call a few weeks ago with two Russian research partners shortly after their country...

  25. Senior US official warns of security threat amid reports of Russian

    ABC News and the New York Times cited unnamed sources as saying that the security threat Turner was referring to involved Russia's potential deployment of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon in space.

  26. Biden will not face charges over classified papers, says 'memory is

    United States category US warned allies about Russian space, nuclear capabilities, source says February 15, 2024. ... government-backed media The Paper reported. ...

  27. Nuclear fusion: new record brings dream of clean energy closer

    Nuclear fusion has produced more energy than ever before in an experiment, bringing the world a step closer to the dream of limitless, clean power. The new world record has been set at the UK ...

  28. Britain invests 100 million pounds in AI research and regulation

    Britain on Tuesday said it would spend more than 100 million pounds ($125 million) to launch nine new research hubs in artificial intelligence (AI) and train regulators about the technology.

  29. Putin Complains About Lack of Piercing Questions From Tucker Carlson

    (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin says he was surprised by a lack of sharp questions from U.S. television host Tucker Carlson in an interview that made headlines around the world last week.